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Character Evidence Reconsidered:
"People Do Not Seem to be
Predictable Characters.'"
by
MIGUEL A. MtNDEZ
Introduction
In commenting on the papers by Professors Roger Park and Pe-
ter Tillers, I have made several assumptions. One is that we are ex-amining the wisdom of increasing the use of character evidence only
in criminal trials. Although recent amendments to the Federal Rules
of Evidence now allow propensity evidence in some civil cases,1 Park,
Tillers, and I have proceeded on the assumption that its increased use
in criminal trials is of greater concern. Another assumption is that
the kind of character evidence that interests us the most is evidence
of uncharged misdeeds. This assumption is consistent with recent
amendments to the Rules.2 It also reflects the assessment of trial
lawyers that character evidence, in the form of reputation or opinion,
is not particularly useful.
Park and Tillers find many of the conventional reasons for ex-
cluding character evidence unconvincing. Though I agree with much
of what they say, in the end, Tillers' views are closer to mine. For this
reason, I comment first on Park's paper.3
Inadequacies of A Priori Rules
One of Park's arguments for abolishing the ban on the use of
character evidence is that the prohibition is aimed chiefly at pre-
venting juror misdecision, not at controlling future conduct.4 Unlike
* My thanks to Aviva Orenstein, a fellow panelist, for this wonderful quotation. It does
not necessarily reflect her views about the value of character evidence as a basis for pre-
dicting behavior.
1. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 415.
2. See FED. R. EvID. 413-14.
3. As often happens in these conferences, scholars asked to present papers for
comment provide more than one draft. Subsequent drafts modify, drop, or add argu-
ments. I have tried to respond to the latest drafts submitted by Park and Tillers. Time
constraints, however, may have led me to focus on points made in earlier drafts but
dropped or modified in subsequent versions. My apologies to Park and Tillers for such
oversights.
4. See Roger C. Park, Character at the Crossroads, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 717, 743-44
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a rule that aims to shape behavior by announcing, for example, the
penalties to be paid for the commission of certain harms, the prohibi-
tion simply seeks to withhold a category of evidence from the jurors.
Admittedly, the rule banning the use of character evidence does
not alter behavior in the same way as does a criminal regulation. If
the ban shapes behavior at all, it is that of the lawyers and the trial
judge who must ensure the exclusion of character evidence, and that
of the jurors who are deprived of the evidence in their deliberations.
Though Park's point is forceful, it helps shift the focus to the reasons
for excluding character evidence. Those who believe that character
evidence may lead jurors to decide the case inappropriately may also
believe that reducing misdecision alone is justification enough for the
rule. Altering the behavior of the courtroom actors is not an insig-
nificant achievement: criminal verdicts-especially guilty ones-carry
profound consequences.
It is one matter to withdraw character evidence from the jurors'
consideration. It is quite another to do so through a mishmash of
rules and exceptions that challenge anyone's intellectual abilities and
perhaps even sanity. Allowing evidence that looks, feels. and smells
like character evidence to be received under the rubric that it is being
offered for a relevant non-character purpose tests the outer limits of
our abilities to comprehend. "Mystification," to use Park's term, has
its own costs, some of which can be seen simply by counting the pages
in the law reports. This, then, is Park's second argument for abolish-
ing the rule.
No one, however, defends retention of the ban on the use of
character evidence on the ground that the rules governing the evi-
dence are easily understood or even clearly stated. More students
encounter difficulties in understanding the rules governing character
than any other evidentiary concept. They are not alone. To this very
day, appellate judges continue to write opinions that betray their in-
complete mastery of the rules.5
The rules governing the use of character evidence were not writ-
ten for the lay person. They are not the equivalent of criminal rules
whose infraction can subject its violator to fines, jail, or worse. The
rules are not concerned with shaping human conduct in everyday af-
fairs, but rather with the kinds of information jurors should consider
in discharging their functions. The rules are directed at lawyers who
try cases, judges who preside over those cases, and appellate judges
who review those cases. They are directed at individuals trained in
(1998).
5. See, e.g., People v. Memro, 905 P.2d 1305, 1348 (Cal. 1996), cert. denied. 117 S.
Ct. 106 (1996). See generally M. MENDEZ, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE WITH COMPARISON
TO FEDERAL RULES § 3.14 (1993).
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the law. Although needless complexity and lack of clarity in statutes
are surely undesirable, the chief focus in assessing the continued vi-
tality of the character evidence rules must be on whether the benefits
of excluding predisposition evidence are outweighed by the costs of
withholding the evidence from the jurors.
The Costs of Exclusion
To Park, these costs are too high. He believes that other-crimes
evidence is much too valuable to exclude categorically. To him, the
fact that all of us use character reasoning in everyday decision-
making must mean that it provides an adequate basis for making pre-
dictions about how others will behave or may have behaved. Like
Park, I would not think of hiring a baby-sitter for my six- and eight-
year-old daughters if I knew that the sitter had recently been accused
of child abuse. I am risk averse in the extreme when it comes to my
daughters' welfare. But not hiring the baby-sitter on account of his
history is different from convicting the sitter of child abuse on ac-
count of that history. I very much want to believe that I would not be
moved to convict the sitter just because he has been accused of child
abuse. But I am unsure whether the accusation would not tilt me
against the sitter in a way that might prevent me from viewing all of
the evidence with the detachment and consideration to which the sit-
ter would be entitled were he on trial for the crime of child abuse.
That, of course, may be a reason for judges to exclude me from
the jury. But unless we are confident that our jury selection proce-
dures exclude potential jurors who might react at least as strongly as I
think I would to the character evidence, the risk of misdecision can
better be minimized by retaining the ban on the use of character evi-
dence than by relying on voir dire.
Park's appeals to recidivist studies do not entirely allay my con-
cerns over the probative value of character evidence any more than
does knowledge that all of us use character reasoning in everyday de-
cision-making. We use character reasoning because it strikes us in-
tuitively as a valid basis for making behavioral predictions about oth-
ers. As Park points out, it's just plain common sense.6 But intuitive
insights, even when widely shared, are not necessarily accurate. Al-
though I now know better, my intuition still tells me each day that the
earth is flat and that the sun rotates around the earth, "rising" in the
east and "setting" in the west. Science, however, has taught me oth-
erwise.
Viewed from some perspectives, the recidivist studies do suggest
that past misdeeds can serve as a basis for predicting future misdeeds.
6. See Park, supra note 4, at 721.
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As Park reports, "Recidivism data.., at a minimum shows that
someone who has been convicted and imprisoned for a criminal of-
fense is many times more likely to commit a similar offense than a
person chosen at random."7 But, even setting aside questions about
methodology,8 the recidivist studies can be read another way.
Park cites a study that shows that the recidivist rate for murder-
ers is 6.6% within three years of release from prison.9 Park derives
from this statistic an annualized recidivist rate of 2200 per 100,000
prisoners released following a sentence served for homicide." Be-
cause the base rate for murder in the general population is 9.8 per
100,000 per year, this study suggests that a person released from
prison after serving a sentence for murder is more than 200 times
more likely to commit a murder than someone randomly selected
from the general population.
Focusing on the base rate can yield impressive numbers. Prose-
cutorial arguments based on such high probability estimates might
indeed move some jurors well along the road to conviction. But the
question is not just how much more likely the accused is to commit
murder than someone selected randomly from the general popula-
tion. It is also how much more likely it is that the accused will com-
mit murder because he murdered before. Since the study found that
only one in fifteen murderers murdered again, the defense could ar-
gue that, statistically speaking, there is but one chance in fifteen that
the accused would murder again. Put another way, a prediction that
he would do so (or did so) would be wrong fourteen out of fifteen
times, a fact that the defense undoubtedly would elicit from the ex-
pert on cross-examination."
7. Id. at 721-22.
8. Park lists many of the deficiencies in the recidivist studies and the problems they
pose in arriving at probability estimates. See id. at 768-72. Some of these deficiencies in-
clude the use of arrest as the measure of recidivism. See id. at 769-70. Some believe that
arrests under report the true rate of reoffending, since some crime is unreported. See J.
MONAHAN, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, THE CLINICAL
PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 52 (1981). The use of arrests, however, can cut in
the other direction. Not everyone arrested for an offense has committed that offense or
any offense. The use of convictions is subject to the same criticism; jurors and judges are
sometimes wrong, and the innocent are convicted. Likewise, relying on guilty pleas can
be misleading; some defendants, though innocent, will accept a plea bargain rather than
run the risk of conviction by a jury and the imposition of a greater punishment.
9. See Park, supra note 726, at 11 n.24 (citing ALLEN J. BECK, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1983 (1989)). The study focused
on the commission of murder and non-negligent manslaughter. For simplicity's sake, I
lumped the offenses into murder.
10. See id. at 11 n.28.
11. Though I don't think that the case has been made for repealing the ban on char-
acter evidence, this example illustrates the importance of giving jurors access to recidivist
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Of course, as Dean McCormick put it, "A brick is not a wall.' 12
Statistical evidence that the accused is more likely than others to
murder again (or commit some other offense) is only one brick
among the many the prosecution might offer in constructing an unas-
sailable wall of guilt. But the issue before us is not the relevance of
that brick in a particular trial. 3 It is whether the recidivist studies are
so compelling as to justify, as a policy matter, repealing the ban on
the use of character evidence in all criminal trials. I don't find the re-
cidivist studies as convincing in that regard as does Park. If anything,
these studies show that it is unlikely that a felon will commit the same
data in the event character evidence should become admissible. Without deciding
whether all evidence is inherently probabilistic, when other misdeeds are admitted to
show the defendant's propensity to commit the misdeed charged, jurors will have to assess
the probability that someone who has committed the uncharged misdeeds will commit the
misdeed charged. Without recidivist data, jurors might be widely off the mark in making
this assessment. Informing them, for example, that there is a 30% likelihood that indi-
viduals who have committed a crime of violence will commit another crime of violence
within 12 months should help them resist an intuitive assessment that the reoffense rate
might be closer, say, to 90%.
"People's intuitive conceptions of randomness, probability, and the use of statistical
concepts depart considerably from those conceptions associated with the axioms of prob-
ability and their consequences such as Bayes's Theorem." Stephen E. Fienberg & Mark J.
Schervish, The Relevance of Bayesian Inference for the Presentation of Statistical Evidence
and for Legal Decision Making, 66 B.U. L. REV. 771, 791 (1986). For example, Tversky
and Kahneman have found that people often do not take base rates into account in mak-
ing predictions and will arrive at probability estimates that differ sharply from those re-
sulting from the application of established probability theories, including Bayes' Theo-
rem. See Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases 3, 4-5,
in D. KAHNEMAN, P. SLOVIC & A. TVERSKY ET AL., JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY,
HEuRisTIcs AND BIASES (1982).
If reliable reoffense data is available for the misdeeds that are admitted, one could
expect the defense to offer such data whenever the data indicate that the reoffense prob-
ability is at least less than 50%. Rearrest data provide a clue about what one might ex-
pect. The recidivist table used by Park indicates that the rearrest rates within three years
of release for persons convicted of the following offenses were: theft 33.5%, burglary
31.9%, drug offenses 24.8%, assault 21.9%, fraud 21.6%, robbery 19.6%, motor vehicle
theft 18.6%, rape 7.7%, and homicide 6.6%. See Park, supra note 4, at 761. Whether ju-
rors will make sound use of statistical evidence is another question, however. Tversky
and Kahneman have found that people often ignore base rates even when available. See
Tversky & Kahmeman, supra, at 4-5. That, of course, is a reason for excluding character
evidence categorically, as this kind of evidence invites the jurors to estimate the defen-
dant's probable guilt from the uncharged misdeed evidence.
12. CHARLES MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
§ 185 at 436 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 2d ed. 1972).
13. Evidence that the defendant is many times more likely to commit murder than a
person selected randomly from the population is still logically relevant under a Bayesian
analysis. See RICHARD 0. LEMPERT & STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, A MODERN
APPROACH TO EVIDENCE: TEXT, PROBLEMS, TRANSCRIPTS AND CASES 159 (2d ed.
1982).
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offense again.1 4
I am concerned also about the ability of jurors to give evidence
of uncharged misdeeds the weight it deserves. I am not worried here
about whether jurors can think in probabilistic as opposed to status
terms. They can. I am concerned, instead, with whether jurors can
assess correctly the probability that someone who has committed the
uncharged misdeeds will commit the misdeed charged. In this re-
spect, I am troubled by the findings of John Monahan. In his study of
the efficacy of clinical (as opposed to actuarial) techniques in pre-
dicting violent behavior, he found that the best research in existence
in 1981 indicated that "psychiatrists and psychologists are accurate in
no more than one out of three predictions of violent behavior over a
several-year period among institutionalized populations that had both
committed violence in the past (and thus had high base rates for it) and
who were diagnosed as mentally ill. "" More recent research has not
undermined his findings. 6
The belief that uncharged misdeeds can help jurors arrive at
more accurate verdicts ultimately rests on the supposition that jurors
are adept at estimating the defendant's probable guilt from the un-
charged misdeeds evidence. But if mental health professionals, using
in-depth clinical examinations as well as "a meticulous reconstruction
14. See generally id. Park cites a Michigan study that focused on the accuracy of an
instrument used to predict the recidivist rate of inmates released on parole. See Park, su-
pra note 4, at 722 n.10. The instrument classified the inmates by five categories, from
presenting a very low risk of re-engaging in assaultive behavior to a very high risk of do-
ing so. The predictions were best for the high risk category. Forty percent of those pre-
dicted as posing a very high risk of committing another assault were arrested for a violent
crime in the follow-up period. That means that 60% were not. That is another of way of
saying that the predictions were wrong more than half of the time. The study is described
in MONAHAN, supra note 8, at 68-71. Other predictions of the recidivist rate of released
inmates have produced many more false positives than the Michigan study, some with a
high of 19 false positives for every 20 predictions. See id. at 68.
Park also cites a North Carolina study that found that 45% of drivers killed in traffic
accidents had an elevated level of blood alcohol and that drivers with one or more arrests
for drunk-driving were eleven times more likely to have elevated levels of blood alcohol
at the time of death than drivers with no arrests. See Park, supra note 4, at 726. Park
then concludes that if all we know about a driver is that he had a prior arrest for drunk-
driving at the time he died in a fatal accident, then we should conclude that there is a 90%
probability that he had an elevated blood alcohol level at the time of death. See id. Al-
cohol, however, is believed by many to be a disease that, unless controlled, induces com-
pulsive behavior. For this reason, I question whether recidivist data relating to chronic
alcoholics say much about human behavior in general.
15. MONAHAN, supra note 8, at 47-49 (emphasis in the original). That Monahan's
conclusion is based on studies of the mentally ill is probably immaterial. Other studies
indicate that the rate of mental illness among the jail population is about the same as in
the general population. See id. at 78. Moreover, studies of mental patients suggest that
past violence, not mental illness, is the best predictor of future violence. See id. at 80.
16. See generally D.H. KAYE, SCIENCE IN EVIDENCE 272-74 (1997).
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of the life history elicited from multiple sources-the patient himself,
his family, friends, neighbors, teachers, employers, and court, correc-
tional and mental hospital [records]" '7 -are wrong two out of three
times in their predictions of violent behavior, then I think that it is
prudent to pause before allowing jurors to make similar predictions
on a much more abbreviated record."
My reluctance to be won over by the recidivist studies may stem
in part from my unfamiliarity with statistics and probability theory.
Others well-versed in these fields can better assess Park's recidivist
arguments. But my hesitation is also due to my inclination to give
studies by personality experts (or at least some of them) more weight
than does Park.
Personality Theory
I have written elsewhere about what personality theorists have
to say about the value of character as a basis for predicting behav-
ior.'9 Here, I provide only a summary of my accounts in order to re-
spond to Park's criticism of personality theories.
Early psychologists believed that certain attributes or mental
structures called "traits" comprised the personality and that it was a
unique combination of these traits that set one personality apart from
all others. Allport, one of the most influential founders of trait the-
ory, believed that traits were the most fundamental "dispositions" or
constituents of personality.' Whether viewed as constructs created
for explanatory convenience or as mental structures that exist in peo-
ple, trait theorists came to believe "that traits are relatively stable
and enduring predispositions" that exert sufficient influence to pro-
duce generally consistent behavior across widely divergent situa-
17. MONAHAN, supra note 8, at 44.
18. My misgivings about the jurors' ability to estimate correctly the defendant's
probable guilt from the misdeed evidence are not allayed by suggestions that errors in
estimates can be reduced by training the jurors to make Bayesian calculations. Commen-
tators are divided on whether such training makes any difference. See David McCord, A
Primer for the Nonmathematically Inclined on Mathematical Evidence in Criminal Cases:
People v. Collins and Beyond, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 741, 816 (1990).
19. See Miguel A. M6ndez, California's New Law on Character Evidence: Evidence
Code Section 352 and the Impact of Recent Psychological Studies, 31 UCLA L. REV. 1003
(1984); Miguel A. M6ndez, The Law of Evidence and the Search for a Stable Personality,
45 EMORY L.J. 221 (1996).
20. G.W. ALLPORT, PERSONALITY-A PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION 286
(1937). He defined a trait as "a generalized and focalized neuropsychic system (peculiar to
the individual), with the capacity to render many stimuli functionally equivalent, and to ini-
tiate and guide consistent (equivalent) forms of adaptive and expressive behavior." Id. at
295.
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tions.2
The application of trait theory to the trait for honesty illustrates
their view of how the theory operates:
The unidimensional approach holds that a person is, or strongly
tends to be, consistent in his behavior over many different kinds of
situations. Thus a person who lies in one situation is not only likely
to lie in other situations, but is also highly likely to cheat, steal, not
feel guilty, and so on.22
The focus on the predictive value of traits was not accidental: the
value of any personality theory depends in part on its ability to pre-
dict individual behavior as well as to identify the elements that make
an individual personality. As the example shows, trait theorists as-
sumed that traits and their behavioral expressions corresponded di-
rectly.
Subsequent empirical research, however, not only failed to vali-
date trait theory, especially its predictive attributes, but generally re-
jected it. Walter Mischel in particular found that "[t]he initial as-
sumptions of trait-state theory were logical, inherently plausible, and
also consistent with common sense and intuitive impressions about
personality. Their real limitation turned out to be empirical-they
simply have not been supported adequately., 23 Instead, research
conducted for much of this century showed that behavior is largely
shaped by specific situational determinants that do not lend them-
selves easily to predictions about individual behavior. Mischel, who
became a leading exponent of the new theory of situational specific-
ity, explains:
First, behavior depends on stimulus situations and is specific to the
situation: response patterns even in highly similar situations often
fail to be strongly related. Individuals show far less cross-
situational consistency in their behavior than has been assumed by
trait-state theories. The more dissimilar the evoking situations, the
less likely they are to lead to similar or consistent responses from
the same individual. Even seemingly trivial situational differences
may reduce correlations to zero.
24
To me, these findings undermine not only "common sense" or
intuitive notions of the predictive value of personality traits; they
threaten also the law's assumption about the probative value of char-
acter evidence. If, as a scientific matter, even trivial situational dif-
ferences can render behavioral predictions invalid, then in my judg-
ment, character evidence should not serve as the basis for in-court
21. WALTER MISCHEL, PERSONALITY AND ASSESSMENT 6 (1968).
22. Burton, Generality of Honesty Reconsidered, 70 PSYCHOL. REv. 481, 482 (1963).
23. MISCHEL, supra note 21, at 147.
24. Id. at 177 (emphasis added).
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predictions by experts or jurors about whether an individual engaged
in specified behavior on a given occasion or was truthful as a witness.
Recent research by Mischel and his colleague, Yuichi Shoda,2
has not changed my opinion. Although Mischel generated much of
the empirical evidence that individual differences in social behaviors
tend to be surprisingly variable across different situations, he none-
theless did not conclude that all the assumptions underlying trait the-
ory were false. Instead, after conducting additional research, Mischel
and Shoda have proposed a new theory of personality that attempts
to reconcile the paradoxical findings on the invariance of personality
and the variability of behavior across situations. Their review of the
empirical data convinces them that the very variability of behavior
observed across situations reflects, rather than denies, "some of the
essence of personality coherence." 6
In their new theory, Mischel and Shoda still reject Allport's the-
ory that discrete predispositions or traits acting alone explain why in-
dividuals engage in certain behaviors across situations. Instead, they
embrace and extend a competing theory that holds that personality is
"a system of mediating processes, conscious and unconscious, whose
interactions are manifested in predictable patterns of situation-
behavior relations."27
But finding these predictable patterns requires more than re-
sorting to recidivist studies or even to a complete history of the occa-
sions in which a subject has engaged in the behavior of interest. As
Mischel and Shoda acknowledge, "[t]o apply [their] theory to a par-
ticular substantive domain, one needs to identify the mental repre-
sentations, and the interrelationships among them (i.e., their organi-
zation) in the processing system that underlie the behavior ofinterest."'
If, for example, one wants to know whether a subject who cheats
his clients is likely to understate his income, one would need to know
how the subject perceives the two situations (cheating clients and
cheating the government) psychologically: how he categorizes and
encodes them cognitively and emotionally, and how those encodings
activate and interact with other cognitions and affects in the subject's
personality system. One would need to discover the active psycho-
logical ingredients in the two situations to begin to arrive at a valid
personality profile or "if ... then..." signature for the defendant.
25. See Walter Mischel & Yuichi Shoda, A Cognitive-Affective System of Personality:
Reconceptualizing Situations, Dispositions, Dynamics, and Invariance in Personality
Structure, 102 PSCYHOL. REv. 246 (1995).
26. Id at 246.
27. Id. at 247.
28. Id. at 259.
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Only by constructing such a personality profile could one predict with
some confidence the likelihood that a particular defendant who
cheats his clients also cheats on his taxes.
Mischel and Shoda acknowledge that their work is but a contri-
bution toward a new conception of personality in which distinctive
and stable patterns of behavioral variability are seen as reflecting es-
sential expressions of an underlying stable personality system. It is
thus doubtful that their findings can meet the tests for admitting ex-
pert testimony in a given case. More importantly, as intriguing as
their findings may be, they do not make the case for repealing the
ban on the use of character evidence. In its current stage of devel-
opment, their theory cannot justify such a profound change.
Park and I differ in that Park does not think that the recent
findings by Mischel and other leading personality theorists should
prevent the repeal of the character evidence ban. Park underscores
that their work was not directed at determining the probative value
of character evidence (especially other-crimes evidence)29 and points
to studies by others suggesting that "aggressive behavior, however
engendered, once established, remains remarkably stable across time,
situation, and even generations within a family."3
In particular Park cites the work of Susan Davies.3 After re-
viewing the psychological literature, Davies concluded that "most
psychologists now recognize that, as a general matter, a lay person,
given information about a subject's past behavior, can predict the
subject's future behavior with a significant degree of accuracy."32
The degree of accuracy, however, is unclear, since Davies admits that
"[c]ontemporary trait theorists willingly concede that they are unable
to predict a single instance of behavior on a particular occasion with
confidence."33 This admission is especially troubling since making
these kinds of predictions is precisely what the reformers would have
the jurors do.
Moreover, Davies' conclusion about the abilities of lay persons
to predict a subject's future behavior with a high degree of accuracy
contrasts sharply with John Monahan's finding that mental health ex-
perts are wrong two out of three times in their predictions of vio-
lence.34
29. See Park, supra note 4, at 730-31.
30. Id. at 735 n.60 (citing MICHAEL R. GOTrFREDSON & TRAVIS HIRSCHI, A
GENERAL THEORY OF CRIME 50 (1990)).
31. See id. at 728.
32. See Susan Marlene Davies, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct. A Reas-
sessment of Relevancy, 27 CRIM. L. BULL. 504, 517 (1991).
33. Id.
34. See supra text accompanying notes 15-17 (citing MONAHAN, supra note 8, at 44).
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Unlike the lay persons Davies may have in mind, the mental
health experts Monahan studied had extensive information about
their subjects. Their predictions were based on in-depth clinical ex-
aminations as well as "a meticulous reconstruction of the life history
elicited from multiple sources-the patient himself, his family,
friends, neighbors, teachers, employers, and court, correctional and
mental hospital [records]."35 The richness of this life history stands in
stark contrast with the paucity of information the reformers would
put before the jurors. Evidence of uncharged misdeeds does not
amount to a life history. Even Davies concedes that a "generalized
trait of character cannot be inferred from one or two instances of a
person's behavior."36 Her assessment notwithstanding, therefore, the
psychological literature at best suggests that social scientists are in
disagreement about the value of past behavior in predicting future
behavior. They disagree about the probative value, if any, of other
misdeeds in fixing the responsibility for the misdeed charged. Since
in addition there are reasons rooted in intuition as well as in social
science for believing that evidence of other misdeeds may give rise to
a different kind of inferential error, I do not think that Davies' as-
sessment of the psychological literature makes a convincing case for
repealing the ban on the use of character evidence.
Attributional Error
Park points out that a principal argument against repealing the
ban on character evidence is the fear that jurors might give character
evidence undeserved weight.3 7 Indeed, I have argued that studies by
social scientists indicate that this might well be the case. Park sug-
35. MONAHAN, supra note 8, at 44.
36. Davies, supra note 32, at 519.
37. See Park, supra note 4, at 738.
38. See Mdndez, California's New Law on Character Evidence, supra note 19, at
1044. Psychological studies confirm the law's intuitive belief that character evidence can
be highly prejudicial. One reason for the prejudice is the setting-the courtroom-in
which the character evidence is heard. Gustav Ichheiser found that, in classifying others,
people are motivated by two factors: "by the attitude of the person performing the classi-
ficatory act and by the situation in which this act is being performed. However, as a rule,
the situation seems to be the dominant factor." Gustav Ichheiser, Misunderstandings in
Human Relations-A Study in False Social Perception, 55 AM. J. Soc. 1, 34 (Supp. 1949).
Because an accused is tried in a setting where wrongdoing is explored, Ichheiser's findings
suggest that jurors are more likely to be receptive to character evidence suggesting guilt
than to character evidence suggesting innocence.
Psychologists have also found that people give greater weight to unfavorable, un-
pleasant, or socially derogatory information about a person than to information of equal
intensity but of a positive nature. See, e.g., Hamilton & Huffman, Generality of Impres-
sion-Formation Processes for Evaluative and Nonevaluative Judgments, 20 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 200, 201, 204 (1971); Schneider, Implicit Personality
Mar. 1998]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
gests that one way to remedy the attributional error is by providing
the jurors with more, not less, character evidence:
Consider a consent defense rape case in which the complainant tes-
tifies that she was raped, the defendant claims that she consented,
there are no eyewitnesses other than the two principals, and the cir-
cumstantial evidence is equivocal.... Excluding other act evidence
does not prevent jurors from making character attributions. It
merely means that the character attributions will be based on trivial
and misleading data .... such as the attractiveness of the defendant
and complainant, the coherence of their stories (which have been
polished extensively by lawyers).... stereotypical thinking about
characteristics such as race, gender, and social class, [and] de-
meanor evidence.
Character attributions are unavoidable. The question is whether
accuracy would be promoted by admitting other-acts evidence....
Merely pointing out the phenomenon of lay dispositionism does not
provide an answer to [that] question.39
Park's argument that attributional error can be reduced or
eliminated by furnishing the jurors with more character evidence, in-
cluding the personal histories of the major players, rests on a presup-
position I do not share, namely, that character has been shown to be
a good predictor of conduct. Moreover, it assumes that jurors will be
adept in making predictions from the evidence if only given more
Theory: A Review, 79 PSYCHOL. BULL. 294 (1973). But see Weinstein & Crowdus, The
Effects of Positive and Negative Information on Person Perception, 21 HUM. REL. 383, 389
("The basic hypothesis that negative information has greater saliency than positive infor-
mation for person perception was generally not supported [by the study].").
This finding suggests that jurors are likely to give greater weight to bad character
than good character evidence, especially given the setting where the evidence is heard.
But perhaps the factor that most induces jurors to overestimate the probative value of
character evidence is what psychologists call the "halo effect." ALLPORT, supra note 20,
at 521. The term refers to the propensity of people to judge others on the basis of one
outstanding "good" or "bad" quality. Id. Combined with the tendencies to see others as
simple people whose behavior is easily predictable and to give greater weight to negative
information, bad character evidence can induce jurors to reach unfavorable conclusions
about a person's behavior which the evidence simply cannot support.
As Park correctly notes, the psychological studies did not test the prejudicial effects
of bad character evidence directly. See Park, supra note 4, at 739-40. Yet they do support
the law's intuitive judgment that character evidence is unduly prejudicial.
Attributional error can also result because jurors may assign an incorrect probability
estimate to the uncharged misdeeds. Jurors who conclude that a defendant is guilty be-
cause "if he did it once, he did it again" are in essence saying that if he committed the un-
charged misdeed, there is a 100% probability that he committed the charged misdeed.
Furnishing the jurors with the correct probability estimates and the appropriate base rates
may not eliminate the risk that jurors will engage in unsupported probability estimates in
determining the defendant's guilt. Research by Tversky and Kahneman indicates that
people often ignore base rates even when available. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra
note 11, at 4-5.
39. Park, supra note 4, at 741.
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character evidence. As I have pointed out, however, studies show
that mental health experts (with much more information about the
"players" than Park suggests jurors should have) are wrong two out
of three times in their behavioral predictions."n Moreover, the call for
more, not less, character evidence raises troubling questions con-
cerning the retention of rape shield laws4' and the ability of trial
judges and appellate judges to administer a rule calling for the discre-
tionary admissibility of a great deal of character evidence.42
Nuliification
Just because Park rejects the claim that inferential error justifies
retaining the ban on the use of character does not mean that Park
calls for the unregulated admission of the evidence. He would em-
power trial judges to exclude the evidence on the grounds of cost and
surprise, as well as the danger of jury nullification.43 As Park ex-
plains: "If character could be explored freely, triers would be
tempted to give litigants what they deserve, not what the law requires
under the particular facts of the case. '
One of Park's most valuable contributions to the debate on
character evidence is helping us see more clearly the dangers of jury
nullification. For those of us with serious reservations about repeal-
ing the ban on the use of character evidence, Park's concerns about
jury nullification supply an additional reason for retaining the status
quo. To Park, however, the concern with jury nullification makes the
case only for excluding the character evidence in a particular trial and
not in all trials. Judges, Park believes, can be trusted to exclude the
40. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
41. Whatever changes may be made to the rules governing the use of character evi-
dence, Park does not favor weakening the rape shield laws. I raise the rape shield laws,
not as a red herring, but because neither Park nor I can guarantee that some legislators
favoring the repeal of the character evidence ban would not also favor repealing these
laws.
That the evidence excluded by the rape shield laws is irrelevant is by no means set-
tled. The California Constitution mandates the use of all relevant evidence in criminal
trials subject to certain exceptions. The sponsors of the initiative that gave rise to this
constitutional provision made sure that the rape shield laws were expressly exempted
from the mandate. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(d).
42. One of Park's concerns is with regard to giving judges discretion to exclude char-
acter evidence on the ground of attributional error, i.e., the risk that the jurors might give
the evidence undeserved weight. To Park, judges, like jurors, are also subject to attribu-
tional error and may wrongfully withhold character evidence from the jurors by giving
undeserved weight to the scientific evidence about how jurors might give excessive weight
to bad character evidence. See Park, supra note 4, at 744-45. But Park's concern will re-
main academic as long as the ban on the use of character evidence is retained.
43. See Park, supra note 4, at 745-46.
44. See Park, supra note 4, at 745.
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evidence on this ground when necessary. Unlike jurors, they can bet-
ter appreciate why it would be wrong to punish a defendant for his
uncharged misdeeds." I do not disagree with Park's assessment of
judges in this respect. His observation accords generally with my ex-
periences as a criminal defense lawyer. Others with different experi-
ences may not agree. There is no need to resolve this controversy,
however. So long as we retain the ban, we will not have to worry
about whether judges can or cannot appreciate the importance of not
punishing defendants on account of who they are.
Limited Discretion
Park's conclusion is that we should consider committing the use
of other-crimes evidence to the discretion of the court.46 That discre-
tion would not be unbridled; he would require the trial judge to apply
specific guidelines in determining whether the probative value of the
evidence is substantially outweighed by its costs. Among the factors
the judge would have to consider in assessing its probative value are
method, frequency, and temporal proximity."7
My objection to this approach is that it is tantamount to the vir-
tual free admissibility of character evidence. Given the prevailing
get-tough-on-criminals attitude, I am concerned whether judges sub-
ject to election are likely to exercise their discretion to exclude evi-
dence of other misdeeds by the accused. As for appointed judges, as
Park acknowledges, "[a]ppointment by the governor does not convey
immunity to flaws in reasoning about behavior."48 In any case, most
sitting judges in California have been appointed by conservative gov-
ernors who have made fighting crime a major theme. Many ap-
pointments not all former prosecutors are incapable of rising to the
standards of impartiality demanded of judges. But especially in these
days when criminal defendants have replaced the Communists as the
principal bogeymen, appointment by the governor, as Park cautions,
is no guarantee of impartiality.
Another reason for believing that reform would result in the al-
most free admissibility of bad character evidence is the virtual unre-
viewability of a trial judge's decision to admit the evidence. The
judge's decision, though guided, still would be discretionary. Appel-
late judges are loathe to second guess and reverse discretionary rul-
ings by trial judges. Their reluctance is enshrined in appellate rules
that require the appealing party-the criminal defendant in this
45. See id. at 30-31.
46. See Park, supra note 4, at 777-79.
47. See Park, supra note 4, at 736-38 and accompanying notes.
48. See Park, supra note 4, at 744.
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case-to show not only that the ruling was wrong, not only that it
prejudiced him in the conventional sense, but that the judge's call
amounted to an abuse of discretion. In terms used by the California
courts, the abuse must be "palpable,"49 meaning that the appealing
party must convince the appellate judges that the trial judge exer-
cised his or her discretion in an "arbitrary, capricious or patently ab-
surd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice."5
Since there will always be some evidence independent of the bad
character evidence to support the guilty verdict, appellate judges
simply will not find that the trial judge's ruling rises to the kind of ar-
bitrary conduct that results in a violation of the standard.
In addition, the California experience with detailed rules de-
signed to regulate judicial discretion has yielded mixed results. As in
many jurisdictions, the use of convictions to impeach witnesses, espe-
cially the accused, has been controversial. Almost thirty years ago
the California Supreme Court laid down rules to guide trial judges in
determining under what circumstances to admit convictions." De-
spite their clarity and sensibility, the rules have spawned so much ap-
pellate litigation that the California courts may have devoted as much
time to reviewing rulings admitting convictions as to reviewing rul-
ings allowing uncharged misdeeds to be used for a non-character
purpose.'
It might be argued that the more liberal admission of character
evidence would reduce the amount of judicial resources devoted to
determining the admissibility of past misdeeds to prove a non-
character purpose. Since the evidence in most instances would be
admissible for a character purpose in the first place, the controversies
over its admission for a non-character purpose would disappear.
That indeed might be the case. But given the powerful inducements
which the adversarial system gives to parties to raise all issues that
plausibly could affect appellate judges, there is every reason to be-
lieve that any savings in judicial resources would be offset partially, if
not entirely, by appellate attention to disputes over whether trialjudges properly exercised their discretion under the guidelines.
49. -People v. Demond, 130 Cal. Rptr. 590,597 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
50. - People v. Jordan, 721 P.2d 79, 82 (Cal. 1986), quoted in People v. Rodrigues, 886
P.2d 1, 33 (Cal. 1994).
51. See People v. Beagle, 492 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1972).
52. Compare the large number of appellate decisions reviewing the use of convic-
tions to impeach discussed in Mdndez, California Evidence, supra note 5, at § 15.07, with
Professor Imwinkelried's finding that the use of other crimes evidence has been the sub-
ject of more published opinions than any other provision of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence. Miguel A. Mendez & Edward J. Imwinkelried, People v. Ewoldt: The California
Supreme Court's About-Face on the Plan Theory for Admitting Evidence of an Accused's
Uncharged Misconduct, 28 Loyola L. Rev. 473, 475 (1995).
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Adversarial Fairness
If we permit evidence of bad character to be offered against the
accused to prove his guilt, then adversarial fairness mandates that the
accused be allowed to use both good and bad character evidence to
show the improbability of his guilt. If his misdeeds can be used to
prove his propensity to commit the misdeed charged, then his good
deeds should likewise be admitted to prove his propensity to refrain
from committing the misdeed charged. More importantly, evidence
of his accusers' propensity to engage in conduct which under the sub-
stantive criminal law excuses or mitigates the misdeed charged,
should likewise be admissible. Self-defense in assault and homicide
prosecutions would open the door to this kind of victim character
evidence. But character evidence about the victim's propensities
would also extend to crimes in which the victim's consent is an issue.
The implications for the rape shield laws are grave.53
Free admissibility also means giving the accused an opportunity
to use bad character evidence to prove that someone else committed
the crime. In a bad check prosecution, if the prosecutor may now of-
fer evidence that the accused passed another bad check a year earlier,
then the accused should be given an equal chance to prove that
someone else committed the offense by evidence that that individual
also had access to the victim's store and passed similar bad checks
there and elsewhere during the period in question.
Opening the gates to more character evidence means opening
them up to more evidence of uncharged misdeeds. Such evidence will
consist of specific misdeeds, which, like criminal misdeeds tried in
American courts, will require their own proof and disproof under the
rules of evidence. Thus, a trial on whether the accused assaulted the
victim could degenerate into a series of trials on whether the accused
committed other assaults on other occasions and on whether the vic-
tim was the first aggressor on other occasions. If the lighting condi-
tions make it impossible for the victim to positively identify the ac-
cused as his attacker, there could also be an additional trial on
whether someone else could have been the attacker. That might en-
tail a trial on whether that person committed assaults on other occa-
sions.
Of equal concern, the free admissibility of uncharged misdeeds
to prove the elements of a crime necessarily raises questions about
53. The rape victim's propensity to engage in assaults or deadly conduct would not.
of course, be at issue. But the victim's propensity to engage in consensual sex would.
Park, however, makes it clear that he disfavors any changes that would weaken the rape
shield laws. Moreover, he bases his arguments for change in part on the recidivist studies
of violent behavior. There are, of course, no recidivist studies of rape victims.
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the wisdom of restraints on using past deeds to attack or support the
veracity of the witnesses called at the trial. Under the California
Evidence Code, only convictions can be used as evidence of a wit-
ness's propensity to lie under oath. 4 The Federal Rules are more
liberal and allow a party also to impeach a witness through that wit-
ness's "prior bad acts."55 The character theory of impeachment is the
same, however: convicts and people who engage in dishonest acts are
not the kind of people who should be believed under oath, and jurors,
therefore, should treat their testimony with caution. The California
Evidence Code expressly prohibits the use of prior bad acts,56 and the
Federal Rules limit their use by binding the examiner to the witness's
answer. 7 Accordingly, if on cross-examination a witness denies hav-
ing cheated on the evidence final, the impeaching party cannot call
the witness's professor to disprove the witness's answer.
Free admissibility of character evidence means allowing the pro-
fessor to testify. It also means allowing a convict whose testimony is
needed to prove why the conviction shouldn't count against his
credibility. If he was wrongfully convicted or if he pled guilty, though
innocent, to avoid the risk of a heavier penalty upon conviction after
a trial,58 then the conviction would say nothing about his propensity
to lie under the oath and the jurors should know that. But that would
entail retrying the case in the middle of someone else's trial. It might
also mean calling witnesses to establish the victim's predisposition to
identify others accurately or inaccurately.
The limitations on impeachment are said to be justified by the
desirability of preventing "sideshows" on credibility from taking over
the "main show," i.e., the issues raised by the pleadings. 9 But side-
shows have the power to distract precisely because of an inescapable
dynamic of adversarial trials. Trial lawyers know that whether they
win or lose almost always depends on which witnesses the jurors
choose to believe and which ones they elect to ignore. Since credibil-
ity almost always determines the outcome, good lawyers will do all
they can to support their witnesses and to undermine the opposing
witnesses. Trial lawyers know that misdeeds that are probative of
mendacity are at least as valuable as misdeeds that are probative of
the elements of the offense charged. Since credibility plays such a
decisive role, shouldn't the per se rules prohibiting or limiting the use
of uncharged misdeeds also be replaced by a rule committing their
54. CAL. EVID. CODE § 788 (West 1998).
55. FED. R. EviD. 609(b).
56. CAL. EVID. CODE § 787 (West 1998).
57. FED. R. EVID. 609(b).
58. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
59. MCCORMICK, supra note 1212, § 41.
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admissibility to the judge's guided discretion?
If the answer to this question is "yes," then we can expect even
more character evidence to be offered in criminal trials. Some char-
acter evidence will be directed at proving or disproving the elements
of the offense. Other character evidence will be offered to support or
impeach the witnesses called to prove the misdeed charged as well as
other misdeeds offered to prove that the accused or someone else
committed the misdeed charged, or that the victim engaged in mis-
conduct that excuses or mitigates the harm allegedly caused by the
accused. The potential for extended inquiry into "collateral" matters
is mind-boggling. Confusion about the issues to be decided, I suggest,
is a reason, though by no means the only one, for continuing the ban
on the use of character evidence.
Another is the potential effect on adversarial fairness of ex-
tended inquiry into good and bad deeds. Park enumerates many of
the claims on scarce judicial resources that might be made in the
event the ban on the use of character evidence is lifted.' Having
been a member of the tribe, I want to focus on one constituency that
may be especially disadvantaged by the freer use of character evi-
dence. It is no secret that public defenders or appointed counsel
serve as the defense lawyers in most prosecutions. Yet, in the compe-
tition for scarce resources, publicly funded defense lawyers have lost
the race to prosecutors. I was a public defender in the mid-1970s, at a
time when public support for defense work was at its most generous.
Even then, prosecutors in my county outnumbered us by more than
two to one and by more than three to one in investigators, although
prosecutors had the support of the law enforcement personnel as-
signed to the case. Even in those comparatively good times we would
have been hard-pressed to find resources to investigate misdeeds by
crime victims and by individuals who might have committed the of-
fense charged. In today's climate, where publicly funded lawyers
have less resources, I worry whether the freer administration of
other-crimes evidence may not turn out to be a one-way street open
mainly to prosecutors.
Guidelines v. Rules of Thumb
Discussions about whether to retain or abolish the rule banning
character evidence should take the concerns of trial lawyers into ac-
count. Nothing makes the planning of a trial more difficult than un-
certainty about the judge's rulings on the admissibility of the evi-
dence. Rules of thumb that call for the exclusion of evidence simplify
the planning task. Committing the admissibility of the evidence to
60. See Park, supra note 4, at 744-45.
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the judge's discretion complicates the task and also makes more un-
certain one's assessments about whether the case should proceed to
trial.
Replacing the rule banning the use of character evidence in
criminal trials with one calling for its discretionary admission raises
all of these concerns. Moreover, if the reform also includes abolish-
ing the limits on the use of character evidence to support and attack
the credibility of witnesses and committing the admissibility of such
evidence to the judge's discretion, the uncertainties can only be com-
pounded.
For over ten years, California lawyers trying criminal cases faced
some of these uncertainties. As a result of a proposition approved by
the electorate in 1982, it was unclear whether the ban on the use of
character evidence had been repealed.6 Until the California Su-
preme Court ruled that the effects of the initiative had been (inadver-
tently) overridden by an amendment to the Evidence Code, it was
uncertain whether the use of character evidence was committed to
the judge's discretion.62
How did the bench and bar deal with this uncertainty? To my
knowledge no studies are available to answer this question. But
friends who are judges, prosecutors, and criminal defense lawyers re-
port that there seemed to be a tacit agreement among the courtroom
players to ignore the character effects of the initiative. That some
judges and lawyers found the ban on the use of character evidence
useful, if not indispensable, in the administration of criminal trials is
worth pondering.
My reservations notwithstanding, Park presents a forceful case.
It is characteristic of the care and reflection that we associate with his
work. He looks at the evidence and concludes that the ban on the
use of character evidence should be reconsidered, perhaps even re-
laxed, though probably not abolished at this time. I look at the same
evidence and reach a different verdict. Clearly, Park has made the
case for re-examining the validity of the assumptions underlying the
ban. Just as clearly, he has established the need for a more focused
scientific inquiry into these assumptions. I no longer embrace the
view that character evidence is without value as a basis for predicting
behavior in all circumstances, or that it invariably moves the trier to
give the evidence undeserved weight. But neither am I convinced that
doubts about the predictive value of character evidence or about the
inferential errors it gives rise to have been satisfactorily dispelled. At
61. Proposition 8 amended the California Constitution by mandating the admission
of all relevant evidence, subject to certain exceptions, such as the discretionary exclu-
sions. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28 (d).
62. See People v. Ewoldt, 867 P.2d 757,763 (1994).
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times, I simply don't know whether the proponents or opponents of
change are right. Since I charge the proponents with the burden of
persuasion, my ambivalence tells me that we should resist lifting the
ban on the use of character evidence until we have better answers to
our questions.
Jurors v. Judges
Tillers shares much of Park's skepticism of the reasons advanced
for excluding character evidence. He is not convinced that all charac-
ter evidence will invariably move jurors to decide the case on an
emotional basis instead of by detached consideration of all of the
evidence.63 Nor does he believe that jurors will consistently accord
undeserved weight to character evidence, at least not any more than
do judges who preside over bench trials. 4 Tillers is concerned that
character evidence might invite jurors to substitute their preferences
for the law's,65 but, like Park, does not find the danger of jury nullifi-
cation a sufficient justification for the categorical exclusion of the
evidence. 6
Tillers' skepticism stems in part from his belief that even under
the present system jurors are exposed to much character evidence. 67
A realist, he shares trial lawyers' suspicions about the efficacy of in-
structions limiting the jurors' consideration of other-crimes evidence
to some relevant non-character purpose. He doubts, as do I, whether
misdeed evidence that might lead jurors to inferential error can
somehow be cleansed of that contagion if repackaged under a non-
character purpose label.
Tillers' skepticism is also rooted in the law's inconsistent treat-
ment of jurors and judges as fact finders. Of all evidentiary prescrip-
tions, the ban on the use of character evidence best reflects the law's
distrust of the jurors' ability to handle relevant evidence with the de-
tachment and reflection we expect of impartial fact finders. Though
in theory the rules of evidence apply equally in bench and jury trials,
appellate review rules betray a double standard. In reviewing rulings
erroneously admitting evidence, appellate judges will assume that
their trial brethren are capable of ignoring inadmissible evidence.'
Consequently, it is much more difficult to reverse a verdict reached
by a judge than one rendered by a jury. Yet, there is nothing in the
63. See Peter Tillers, What is Wrong With Character Evidence?, 49 HASTINGS L.J.
781, 786-88 (1998).
64. See id. at 787.
65. See id. at 785-86.
66. See id. at 787-88.
67. See id. at 788.
68. See MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § 60.
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training and work of judges that confers upon them a special immu-
nity to the deleterious effects of character evidence. Thus, if jurors
cannot be trusted to handle character evidence with the care it re-
quires, neither can judges. Or put another way, if judges can be
trusted with the evidence, so can the jurors.
Tillers' argument is appealing. But it is not as pertinent to
criminal proceedings as one might think. Defendants who choose to
place their fate in verdicts usually choose jurors, not judges, as their
final arbiters. To be sure, strategic considerations sometimes do fa-
vor bench trials, but the circumstances giving rise to those considera-
tions are rare. Still, the use of a double standard in assessing the ca-
pacity of jurors and judges to handle character evidence does leave
me with a sense of unease.
Character v. Autonomy
Of Tillers' many contributions to the debate on the wisdom of
banning character evidence, one of the most valuable is his insight
into the connection between character and human autonomy. Tillers
believes that respect for human dignity requires the law to treat hu-
man beings as autonomous, self-governing creatures.69 In his view,
the use of character evidence is inconsistent with this model. Charac-
ter evidence invites jurors to treat human conduct as the product of
traits, instead of free will; consequently, respect for human autonomy
requires the law to exclude uncharged misdeeds when offered to
prove the defendant's predisposition to commit the charged mis-
deed.7'
Tillers cites Herbert Packer in support of his thesis.7 In his clas-
sic work on the nature and limits of the criminal sanction, Packer
notes that our criminal model assumes free will, not because it has
been proven that humans in fact have the capacity to choose between
good and evil, but because in the absence of a practical alternative,
this model allows us to locate that point before which the individual
69. See Tillers, supra note 63, at 795.
70. An example of the kind of behavior Tillers may have in mind is illustrated by re-
search on the effects of child abuse on later violent behavior. According to Kaufman and
Zigler, about 30% (plus or minus 5%) of all children who are physically abused, sexually
abused, or extremely neglected will subject their offspring to one of these forms of mal-
treatment. Kaufman & Zigler, Do Abusive Children Become Abusive Parents?, 57
AMERICAN J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 186, 190 (1987) cited in J. MONAHAN & L. WALKER,
SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAw 369-70 (1990). Since the 30% who become abusive parents did
not choose to be abused as children, under Tillers' autonomy model, it would be inappro-
priate to use their inclination to abuse as the basis for predicting their likelihood to abuse
their own children.
71. See Tillers, supra note 63, at 794 n. 27.
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is free from societally imposed constraints.72 The evolution of the in-
sanity defense exposes some limitations on Packer's claim. One
would think that lack of volition resulting from mental illness should
result in an acquittal by reason of insanity (I knew I was squeezing
her neck, I knew that it was wrong, but I couldn't help myself.).
Though the American Law Institute definition of insanity includes
lack of volition,73 that prong has now been repealed in those jurisdic-
tions that came to accept it. Moreover, despite its consistency with
first principles of criminal law, that prong was never accepted by
those jurisdictions that retained only the traditional definition of in-
sanity. 4
Still, inconsistencies between basic criminal law assumptions and
current criminal doctrines do not drain Tillers' point of all its vitality.
But as a good scholar, Tillers points out several possible weaknesses
in his argument. One of the more interesting is the question of
whether character is necessarily inconsistent with autonomy.75 If
character is not inherited, if it consists of traits that are self-imposed,
then traits are the product of autonomy, and behavior shaped by such
traits in the final analysis is the product of free choice.76
A difficulty with this explanation is the lack of evidence that the
mental qualities that define us and differentiate us from others are
the result of free choice. Moreover, as Tillers seems to suggest, if
having killed in the past is evidence of an inclination or propensity to
kill, one has to ask how free the actor was in "electing" to kill in the
first place. If he killed under coercion, then the example would not
be illustrative of choosing to have a trait predisposing one to kill.
Tillers' response is to appeal to Hegelian logic: that free choice is
not synonymous with unconstrained choice and that free choice ac-
quires meaning only in light of limitations that may be imposed upon
a particular choice.77 But if this is true, one still has to worry about
the nature of the "limitations." If one chooses to kill in order to save
one's self, that "choice" could hardly serve as persuasive evidence
that the actor has chosen to respond with deadly force in other situa-
tions. Whether one has chosen to acquire a particular trait seems to
require an assessment of whether the past misdeeds evidencing the
trait were themselves the product of free choice. Still, the need for
such an inquiry argues against the categorical exclusion of character
72. H.L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 86-87 (1968).
73. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Tentative Draft No.
4) (1955).
74. See P. JOHNSON, CRIMINAL LAW 294-95 (5th ed., 1995).
75. See Tillers, supra note 63, at 794.
76. See id.
77. See id. at 808.
[Vol. 49
CHARACTER EVIDENCE RECONSIDERED
evidence. A rule of exclusion would have to be case specific. It
would apply only if the judge were satisfied that the past acts offered
as evidence of a freely acquired trait were not themselves the product
of free choice. Interesting as this point is, I do question whether even
a legislature that is not biased in favor of crime victims and against
criminal defendants would approve of a rule requiring such high ad-
ministrative costs.
What is Character?
Tillers makes another important contribution to the debate on
the wisdom of retaining the ban on the use of character evidence by
raising an issue that often is ignored. What does the law mean by
"character evidence"? Tillers argues that character, as conceptual-
ized by legislators, judges, codifiers, and legal commentators, is
merely a fortuitous aggregation of attributes and propensities." To
Tillers, such a conception is nonsense, as it is but a reflection of
Hume's assertion that human knowledge consists essentially of in-
formation we acquire through our senses and that information so ac-
quired does not lend itself to determinations about the causes of
events (including a determination about why we may behave in spe-
cific ways on particular occasions).79
Tillers maintains that the human personality has more substance.
He believes that "human creatures have an internal system of rules,
principles, procedures, or operations that regulates, directs, or or-
ganizes their behavior and activity ...."'o To understand what peo-
ple are like, it will not do merely to describe their tendencies or dis-
positions.8'
The only reason that a description of a person's dispositions or ten-
dencies ever works-the only reason that such a description ever
"says" anything about a person's likely behavior-is that either the
person providing the description or the person receiving it implic-
itly provides or infers the rules and operations that "cause" the de-
scribed disposition or tendency. There must be some rule or princi-
ple or set of rules or principles that "generates" the disposition.
Otherwise, there is no basis for making any judgments about
when-under what circumstances-the disposition in question
might swing into action.82
Mischel would not disagree. Individuals do possess such a sys-
78. See iU2 at 818.
79. See id at 820-21 (citing DAvID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE (1738,
Past Masters CD-ROM ed., 1992).
80. See id at 825.
81. See id at 827.
82. Id at 827-28 (emphasis in the original).
Mar. 1998]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
tem, one that helps explain behavioral choices. Individuals possess
personalities, not in the static sense contemplated by the trait theo-
rists, but a dynamic though "stable system that mediates how the in-
dividual selects, construes, and processes.., information and gener-
ates social behaviors .... , It is the stability of the system that, with
proper testing, can allow an expert to predict a subject's behavior
with some degree of confidence.
Should we retain, abandon, or reform the rules governing the use
of character? Tillers thinks that in light of the complexities attending
the nature of character, it would be prudent "to pause before per-
forming radical surgery on the remnants of the character evidence
rule."84 Tillers also believes that some of the nonconventional rea-
sons he advances for retaining the ban warrant further study. I agree.
Values beyond misdecision and adversarial fairness may justify the
ban. Tillers' insights into the relationship between character and
autonomy especially merit more attention.
83. Mischel & Shoda, supra note 26, at 246.
84. See Tillers, supra note 63, at 831.
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